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BEXPLANATORY STATEMENT
I. INIRODUCTION
I. The Political Affairs committee suggests thet the first step should
be to submit to the Council a proposal- for a uniform procedure -as regatas
the electoral System, the right to votg, the riiht. to etahd-.fgr elect-|pJ!,
vlcant seats and ele.ction day. An elecboral procedure obviousS,y. com-
prises many more aspects that could be harmonized.
In an attenpt to eettle the most 5:nportant points first and avoid
unnecessary complications, the comnittee has opted for the BteP-by-step
approach.
2. It discussed the various systems in force in the i{ember states for
elections to national parliaments and the European Parliament' A sunmary
of the main features of the laws governing the first elections to the EuroPean
parliament ie attached as Annex 1. The committee also discussed othefl'
electoral systems particularly those used for the Italian Senate, the
German Bundestag and the lrish elections.
Ihe committee came out in favour of finrij.no a systbm that incoronrat-erl
both the principle of proportional representation of the political forces and
features of the personil vote system'
II. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING TTIE COMMT'NITY SYSTE}4
3- Ihe Treaties of Rome and Paris provide that:
'The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct
universal suffrage in accordan ce with a uniform procedure in all Member
States. The Council shalI, acting unanimously, lay dovrn the appropriate
provisions, which it shall recomrnend to lvlembe-rc States for adoption in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements' (Articles
2L of the ECSC Treaty, 138 of the EEC Treaty and 108 of the EAEC Treaty).
Article 7(1) of the Act of 20 Septembec L976 confirms that it is up to
the European Parliament to propose a uniform procedure.
The Treaties, hcrvrever, do not define what is meant by 'uniform
procedure'. But it is generally accepted today that 'uniform' d.oes not
mean 'identical' and that the definitive uniform Procedure can be
arrived at in several stages once t?te final objectives have been clearly
defined.
In our opinion, the uniform system ought
account of various general considerations to
take the greatest possible
defined:
to
be
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(a) the eLectoral system should guarantee maximum uniformity so as
to ensure that equal weight attaches to each vote. At the same
time, room must be allor.ced for national peculiaritiesi
(b) the etectoral system should resemble as far as possible the
nodels tried in the individual States and trueted by their
citizens and should not neglect tJre scales of valueE at the
core of tJle political life of the &lenlcer States;
(c) the electoral system Ehould help to create direct contact
between the electorate and their elected representatives;
(d) the electoral system should gruarantee the main politlcal
forces representation in the European Parliament;
(e) the electoral system should guarantee each Conununity citizen
residing in theConmrnitythesigsg to vote and stand for
election;
trtre cmmittee should consider the advisability of calling into
question the present system of allocating seats which seems to be
generally accepted. For the sal<e of effectivEnese and in'order tb adhere
to the timetable, \,ue propoEe to deal with the two problems separately.
IIT. FUNDN{B{TALS
4. First of all it Ehould be noted that the term ,9]g!gg1_l1g!g, is
here tal<en t,o mean the way in which the results of an election d,etermine
the compoeition of a parlLament.
There are two basic electoral systems: the ma.ioritv svstem and
proportional representation.
Under tlre maioritv svEtem, the votes cast for a candidate who has
not been elected are not talcen into consid,eration when seatE are
allocated.
Under proportional representation, on the other hand, all the votes
are in princJ-p1e taken into coneid.eration when the seats are allocated
proportionally, except when a threshold applies (see Ctrapter V).
5. In practice, nost electoral systems J.ncorporate features of boill
proportional representation and the rnajority system.
rhe united Kingdom (excluding Northern rrerand) employed a majority
system for the elections to the European Parliament, whereas lreland used
a special system closely related to the majority system. The other eight
Member States used systems of proportional representation although there
were nevertheless conEiderable differences betrreen them.
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The differences chiefly arise from the use of the '1ist system' .
There are three t14Pes of list:
(a) the 'Iigi4l-EgjqlEggg in which the elector cannot change the
order of candidates (Germany and France in 1979 and Greece in 1981);
(b) the ,loose' or 'preferential' list svstem in which the order of
candidates can be altered (Belgiun, Denmark, Italy and ttre Netherlands
L979) t
(c) the '@ (vote-sPlitting) in which the elector '
votes for any list or candidate he desires (Luxembourg in 1979).
-G. tt would-Ee poEsi-ufe in Ln election-to- use tfte syl€em oflioportionaf
representation as a basis and include elements of the majority system'
This could be done as fo]lows:
multi-member constituencies would be formed,
area being determined by the l"lember Statesi
the votes secured by the Iists of candidates
be added together at national tevel and the
according to the drHondt systemi
the seats allocated to the lists would then
Iists at constituency 1evel on the basis of
in accordance with the d'Hondt system.
their number and geograPhical 
'
in the constituencies would
seats altocated to each fist
be distributed between these
the number of votes obtained
7. Ttre diagram belo* sets out the ttreoretically conceivable mode&$:
Tvpes of electoral svstems
(a) I'hioritv svstem
constituency
twtt
ballote
s looad rt'4t" '
it- (preferdutialMUnl-memberconstituency open listE l$$ts.
 ; 
-1 rigiil
ting)
proportional proportional
representation
ballots
ssats allocated
tpitlr eXectoralguotientsl
(Eagenlcach-Bischof f
and variations)
combination of (a) and (b)
allocated
by divis6r eysteml(d'Hondt +nd
varlatlons)
Bfr &tut49/#{p,/f{8.
'l
- E A. &+.a.i I s t€e -[trno* 2
(c)
'6
IV. PROPOSED FEilTIJRES OF A T'NIFORI{ ELECTORAL SYSTED'I
8. Any atternpt to apply the principles set out in paragraph 6 will shcr',
that ttte draft eleetoral system can neLther be pure proportional repreEer
tation nor tlre rnajority systen since ttre first would greatly disturb tJre
United Kingdom's poLitical traditionE and the Eecond the po3-itical
practices of the other Ivlember States.
Both the Subconmittee on a Uniform Electoral Procedure and the Politica1
Affairs committee were looking for a hybrid electoral system which would
combine certain advantages of the personal vote with those of proportional
representation. With this in view, the subcommittee proposed two afternative
hybrid systems to the Po1itical Affairs Committee. Alternative A was based
on the system used for elections to the German Bundestag (See point 10)
and alternative B was similar to the electoral systems used by several l
Member States for the June 1979 European elections'
After detailed discussion, the Political AffairE committee decided in
June I98I in favour of alternative A, (therBundestag' system) and ashbd
the rapporteur to draw up a draft act accordingly. Hovrever, subsequent
discussions in committee revealed the difficulty of finding a solution
to the problem of over-rePresentation, given that the number of seats
in the European Parliament had been laid down by the Council in 1975 and
that the potitical Affairs Committee had always considered inappropriate
any proposals to alter the distribution of seats among the Member states'
Some members of the Pol.itical Affairs Committee also felt that
introduction of the iBundestag' electoral system in the small l"lember
states might cause major problems, particularly by increasing the danger
of over-representation, with regard to the number of seats Per country'
The political Affairs Committee therefore decided ultimately in
favour of the rapporteurrs alternative B with some changes, and took a
decision of principle to this effect in December 1981- This decision
was confirmed in January 1982 with the adoption of the mixed system of
mrrlti-member constituencies with allocation of seats by the d'Hondt system'
Throughoutthesedelicateandprolongeddiscussionstherapporteur
endeavoured to retain elements of the personal vote and proportional
representation systems. such models exist in the electoral laws of several
Member states. one is used for elections to the Italian senatei another
form was used by the Federal Republic of Germany for the 1979 European ''
elections.
The hybrid system recotnmehded by the British Government when drafting
legislation foi the first direct elections to the European Parliament involves
the creation of large constituencies, each with a multi-member list' and
the possibility ot preterential votr.ng.
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The system peculiar to Ireland and Northern Ireland is also worth
mentioning.
9. Let us no,v consider some of the mixed systems currently in force in
tlre Member Statesls
(a) The svstem of election to the ltalian Senate
The system of election to the Senate can be described as a mixed
system which in practice operates as proportional representation.
The 315 senators are in theory elected, on the basis of single-member
constituencieE by an absolute majority of 65%.
fn constituencies where no candidate has obtained the number of
votes necessary for immediate election, a special system nevertheless'
aIl-orps the votes obtained by the various cand,idates to be pooled
together as party votes at regional level. By Iaw each cand.idate for
election to the Senate may, if he so desires, form a group with at least
trilo other candidates from the same region. In practice all cand,idates
from any one party standing in the same region may form a group so that
they in fact represent a regionat list.
I
-T'he description of the various systems is based 6rr,) *European EIectmL
-- systems ganauoor, by Ge_orgetliirrr/sasse, L";e; rsig. . -
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1[tre regional e]-ectoral office calculates the total number of votes
obtained by each group of candidates in constituencies in which none of
them has obtained the absolute rnajority of 65%. Ttre office then allocates
seats in accordance with the d'Eondt method, i.e. by successively
dividing each grroup's total poII by L, 2, 3, 4 etc- up to the nunlber
of seats to be fiIlect. Ttre seats are then awarded to each 'Iist' in
descending order of ttre highest quotients. I'rom each 'ILst' the
candidateE obtaLning the highest nurnber of votes e:<trlressed as a Percentage
of the registered electorE in their constituency qre declared elebted'
(b) Ttre system of election to ttre Geman Bundestaq
10. Ttre electoral system of ttre Federal Repqblic of @rmany is a
cotibination of tlre majority system and proportional representation in
whictr the latter exertg a decisive influence on the allocation of seate.
Ttre country is dtividecl into 249 conEtituencies although the Bundestag
has 498 mernlcerE (and an additional 20 deputiesr for Berlln) . On each
ballot paper (see annex) each elector has ttro votes, the first under
ttre majority system and the second under proportional representation.
[tre deputy of a constituency is elected by a relative maJority of
electors' first votesi the candidate obtalning the highest nlrnber of
votes is elected.
Ilhe second vote iE cast for a Land listi seats are allocated betueen
the different llEts in accordance wittr the d'Eondt method.
11. The two systems are cornbined by subtracting the Eeats won by a
party in the constituencies, i.e. by the majority system, from the
seatg obtained by it on ttre Iand list, i.e. by proportional rePresentation.
If the number of seats won by a party in the constituenry is greater than
the nurnber it obtains follorling the diEtribution of second votes among
the Land list, it is allcmed to keep the extra seats (supernumerary seats).
In such a caEe the total number of Bundeetag deputieE is increased by
the number of super-numerary Eeats. ThiE procedure has not hovrever been
applied since the l-961- elections when there were three suPernumerary
Eaats.
(c) Ttle svstem of election to the lirrrGnch National Asseniblv
L2. Election by atrsolute rnajority in two bal-lots. To be elected in the
first ballot a candidate must obtain an absolute majority and at Least
one-quarter of the valid votes cast by registered electorE. In the
second ballot, which takeE place one week later, a relative majority is
Eufficient.
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(d)
Only candidates polling at least L2.5% (since the 1976 law was
passed) of the votes cast by registered electors in the first ballot may
take part in the second.
Should only one candidate fulfil this condition, the candidate with
the second highest number of votes is admitted to the second ballot.
13. Should no candidates fulfil ttris condition, a second ballot is held
betrleen the two candidates polling the most votes at the firet ballot'.
No candidate or substitute may stand for election in more than one
constituency.
Svstem of election to the lrish Parliament
14. Ttre names of the candidates appear in alphabetical order on the
ballot paper. The voter, who has one transferable vote, indicates the
order of his choice by writing 1 opposite ttre name of his first' choice,
2 opposite the name of his second choice, 3 opposite the name of his
third choice and so on" He is free to indicate a preference for one
candidate onJ-y, or for a limited number of candidates or for each of
the candidates in the order of his choice (see Annex) '
In this way the voter gives instructions to the returning officer to
transfer his vote to ttre candidate of his second choice if the candidate
of his first choice receives more than the quota of votes necessary for
election or if his first choice is eliminated (through receiving so few
votes as to have no chance of election). If the same situation applies
to his second choice the vote may be transferred to his third choice and
so on. Ttre quota of votes which is ttre number of votes necessary for
election of a candidate is ascertained by ctividing the total number of
valid papers by the nr:mber of seats plus one and adding one to the result;
e.g. if there were 40,000 valid PaPers and 4 seats to be filled the quota
would be 8,001, i.e. j!Q/Q@ + 1. It will be seen that in this example(4+:)
only four candidates could possibly reach the quota'
15. At the end of any count any candidate who has received. a number of
votes equal to or greater than the quota is deemed, to be elected. If a
candidate receives more than the quota his surplus votes are transferred
to the remaining candidates in the foI]-ovring way. If the candidate's
votes are all first preference votes, all his ballot PaPers are sorted'
into separate parcels according to the next preference shown on them'
A separate parcel is made of his non-transferable votes (papers on which
a subsequent preference is not shown) . If the surplue is less than the
number of transferable votes each remaining candidate then receives from
the appropriate parcel of transferable votes a number of votes calculated
PE 64.559fi+C/f in.-9
as fol-Itrs s
, r s'ltolo" 
-- = = :=r== x number of papers in parcel .Total ntrmber of transferable votes
16. If ttre surptus is equal to or greater than the number of transferable
votes, each candidate wilL receive all ttre votes from the appropriate
parcel of transferabLe votes. lf the surplus arises out of transferred.
papers, the papers ln the parcel last transferred to that candidate are
examined and this parcel is then treated in the sElme way as a surplus
conelsting of first preference votes. If two candidates exceed the quota
the larger surplue Is distributed first. If no candldate has a surplus
the lcruest of the remaining candidates is eliminated and his PaPerE are
transferred to the other remaining candidateE according to the next
preference indicated on them. If a ballot paper is to be transferred
and the second preference shcrvrn on it is for a candid,ate already elected
or eliminated the vote passes to the ttrird choice and so on. Counting
continues until all the seats have been fiIled. If the position is
reached where the nurnlcer of seats left to be filled is equal to the
number of candidates stIII in the running these candidates are declared'
elected without having obtained the quota. SimLlarly, if only one seat
remains to be flIlecl and one candidate has more votes than all- the other
remaining candidates togrether with any surplus votes not yet distributed,
that candidate is deemed to be eLected without havlng reached the quota.
V. TIIE ELECTORAI, THRESHOI,D
17. Ttre term 'electoral threEhold' means that votes for candidates or
lists that have not obtained a certain percentage of the votes cast are
not tat<en into consideration when allocating seats.
Under proportlonal representatlon, the threshold le often 5% (g.g. ln
@rmany and France for direct elections). Ttre purpose of the threshold
is to ensure that no Eeats are allocated to unrepresentative minorities.
1[he relatively small nurnber of members to be elected to t]re European
parliament in each llember State implies a 'technical' threshold. 1.3% of
the voteE are needed to obtain a seat in one of the four 'large' Member
States and L6.7% in Luxembourg.
I8, In view of these differences, it is clear that the same threshold in
all the l{ember States would not produce the same resultE. The, rapporteur
therefore proposes that the establishment of a threshold be Ie'ft,to thq
discretion of the individual lrlember States
-r0 PE 84.569/i+C/ttn;
IVI. DEROGATIONS
lg.Initsreso}utionof14JanuarylgT5ontheadoptionofadraft
conventionintroducingelectionstotheEuropeanPartiamentbydirect
universal suffrager, ,n. European partiament made no proPosars concerning
derogations j_n respect of special ethnic, geographical or constitutional
factors in the Member States' However' some provisions of this 
type were
included in the Act governing the election of the rePresentatives 
of
the Assembly by direct universal suffrage2' erticle 7(2) states that
,pending the entry into force of a uniform erectorar procedure
andsubjecttotheotherprovisionsofthisAct,theelectoral
proceduresha}IbegovernedineachlvlemberStatebyitsnational
Provisions. '
According to Annex I '
,The Danish authorities may decide on the dates on which the
electionofmemberstotheAssemblyshalltakeplaceinGreenland.'
InviewofthespecialstatusoftheChannellsfands,thelsleof
Man and Gibrartar, the united Kingdom requested that they be 
excluded
from the Act. Annex II therefore states that
'The United Kingdom will appty the provisions of this 
Act only
in resPect of the United Kingdom.'
The Act contains a third derogation, in the form of a Declaration
by the Government of the Federat Republic of Germany:
,The Government of the Federat Republic of Germany declares that
the Act concerning the election of the members of the European
ParliamentbydirectuniversalsuffrageshallequallyaPPlyto
Land Berlin'
InconsiderationoftherightsandresponsibilitiesofFrance,
theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernlreland'and
theUnitedStatesofAmerica,theBerlinHouseofDeputieswill
electrePresentativestothoseseatswithinthequotaofthe
Fe<leral Republic of Germany that fall to Land Berlin' !
TheActthusrecognizesthespecialstatusoftheLandofBer}in
whichresultsfromanagreementbetweentheMemberstatesreferredto
inthedeclarationandtheGovernmentoftheFedera}Republicof
Germany.ThethreerepresentativesoftheLandofBerlininthe
European Parliament are consequently elected at one remove'
16r-*o. 
" 
sr, rr. 2 . r97 s
2 oJ t*o . L 278, 8.Io -1976
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20. Special provisions applying these derogations were included by the
national parliaments in their laws concerning elections to the European
Parliament in respect of the regions of Brussels, Greenland, West Berlin,
South Tyro1, VaI dtAosta and Friuli, and Northern lre1and.
Account is taken of the status of Brussels as a bilingual town by
allowing electors the possibility of voting either for candidates on the
List for the French-speaking region or for candidates on the list for
the Flemish-speakir,g tegionl.
The special status of Greenland is recognized in Annex I to the Council
Act and by a speciaL electoral law adopted by the Folketing2. The German
electoral Iaw contains a number of provisions which take account of the
special status of the Land of Berlin3.
The Italian electoral faw contains special provisions4 aimed at
defending the rights of Iinguistic minorities in the North of Italy
by granting them appropriate representation within the European Parliament.
The British electoral law provides for a special electoral system to be
used in Northern Ireland, totally different from that adopted for England,
Scotland and Wales, in order to ensure representation of the minority in
the European Parliament5.
2L. The rapporteur proposes in Article 4 of the draft Act that these
derogations should be renewed. The special factors for which provision
had to be made in national legislation on the first European elections
still appIy. I{oreover, it would seem advisable to Prepare for the
possibility of derogation in the event of the accession of Spain and
Portugal to the Community. Lastly, although.no provisions of this type
appear in the 1975 European Parliament resolution, the rapporteur
considers tbat express but unrestrictive reference should be made
to them.
1 Lu", of 16.II.1978 on direct
Articles 4 and 5 (PE 57.047,elections to the European parliament,P.4)
La$, on the election of Danish representatives to the European
Parliament, Article 2 (PE 54.524, p.2)
Law of L6.5.1978 on the election of I'lembers of the European
Parliament from the Federal Republic of Gernany, Articles 29 and 30
( PE 54 . 7 57, pp . 20-2L)
Law No. 18 of 24.L.1979 on the election of ltalian representatj.ves
to the European Parliament, Article 12 (PE 57.047, p.221
European Assembly Elections Act 1978, section 3 and Schedule I(PE 54.757, pp.24 and 28)
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It should be emphasized that Article 4
the way open for l,lember States to avoid its
Affairs Committee wished to llmit the scope
for so as to retain a maximum of unj-formity
of the draft Act does not leave
application. The PoliticaI
of the exceptions provided
in the electoral- procedure.
The exceptions are thus restricted to special geographical or ethnic
factors recognized by the written or unwritten Constitution of the State
concerned. In the view of the rapporteur and the Political Affairs
Committee, dtry special factor should be recognized by some provision
of a constitutional nature - either 1aw, regulation, custom or practice.
At the same Lime the rapporteur wishes to take account of national laws
or tradit.ions which are regarded as provisions of a constitutional nature.
If, in this sensitive area,the Council intends to ask for Parliamentrs
opinion on the inclusion of exceptions in the Counci] Act, it could do so,
in the rapporteur's vj-ew, under the provisions of Articl-e 13 of the Act of
20 September L976. On the basis of this Article, the Council may consult
Parliament before deciding on the final text of the Act; this would seem
an appropriate procedure for determining the way in which the Council
implements Article 4 of Parliament's draft Act.
VII. PROPOSED II,IODEL
22. A proportional system for the allocation of seats is necessary to
ensure that the najor political forces are represented within the
European Parliament.
To help establish direct links between the electors and their elected
representatives, provision must be made within this system for personalized
voting and the maximum number of seats for each multi-member constituency
should be restricted to 15. The hybrid system proposed contains no
elements of the majority system.
It is suggested that the territory covered by the elections (i.e.
each lvlember State) should be divided into multi--member constituencies
within which the members are elected by proportional representation on
the basis of regional or national lists.
Each elector would have one vote and would vote for one of the
candidates on the list. The decision on whether to introduce
preferenLial voting would 1ie with the l,lember States.
Seats would be allocated at national Level to each l-ist or
combination of lists in accordance with the d'Hondt system, taking
account of the total number of votes secured by the list or combination
of lists involved. The seats so aflocated would then be divided between
the lj-sts concerned in accordance with the d'Hondt system on the basis
of the number of votes secured in the constituencies.
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rt would be left to the Ivlember s.uf"-.o a."idJ; tl-,.-;-;;lr".y--was to be divided into constituencies and whetherr'ists wour-d be used, wirh the proviso that each ,";i:::i"ir:: ;:::"rr'include at least three and no more than fifteen seats.
The order of candidates' names on each list wourd be used to determinethe order in which those candidates rcere elected except in the caseof preferentiaL voting.
The decision to apply a threshold wour-d be reft to the discretion of,the Member states in view of the substantiar differences in the number ofrepresentatives to be elected in the various Member States. The smallerthe number of seats, the higher the technical threshold.
23' The I'lember states could be divided into constituencies as fol10ws:
MenEre
Population
Constituencies
rnin.Tnro<.'
' Breakdortrn of constituencies
in June 1979
Belgium
Derunark
Germany
FLance
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxenrbourg
NletherLands
United Kingdon
24(9.8 m)
I6(5.05 m)
81(6I.4 m)
81(53.59 m)
24(9.5 m)
T5(3.37 m)
8I(57 m)
6(0.354 m)
25(14.09 m)
81(55.90 m)
min. 2
ra:(. 8
rnin. 2
max. 5
min. 6
nta><. 27
min. 6
nax. 27
rnin. 2
max. 8
min. 1
max. 5
min. 6
ma><. 27
min. I
max. 2
nin. 2
max. 8
min. 6
rnax. 27
3 constituencies with2 electoral colleges
I + Greeni_and
l- or J-0 and Berlin
1
1 (et. 81)
4
5
I
I
78 + I (Northern lreland)
'Each state may be divided into several constituenci_es representedby a variable number of membersr subject to the aL,ove limits. since thenumber of members all0cated to each Ivlember state is fixed, it may be very
::r:l:I::r.i":::.impossible, ro use the votes left over (remainders)
The Member sta@ const ituenciel w:_tfrl
members
to use
(e.g. 15) so as to eliminate as far as possibte the
larger number
difficulty of
of
ho\",their remainders.
This system arso enabr-es each Member state to take accountcasesr such as Berrin, Greenrand, Northern rreland and the Var_
of special
d'Aosta 
"
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National authorities may allow for preferential, voting within a List,
but vote-splitting is forbidden.
VIII. THE RIGHT TO VOTE
24. Every citizen of a Member State of the European Community resident
withln the Community should be able to participate in eLections. This
entitlement should be guaranteed by the right to vote in the country of
which the person concerned is a national and should be independent of the
place of residence, where the fatter is situated within the Community.
However, if the European Parliament is to be as representative as
possible, progress has to be achieved in this area. Ireland and the
Netherlands granted nationals of other Member States genuinely resident
in their countries the right to vote in the 1979 European elections.
In the Netherlands this right was confined to those persons deprived
of the right to vote in their country of origin by the government of
that country.
These national initiatives should now be harmonized at European level
by the'draft Act. Article 5 of the draft stipulates that the Member States
must grant the right to vote to nationals of other l'lember States who have
been resident in their country for at least five years.
Nationals of Member States who have been resident in another
I,lember State for less than five years must be guaranteed the right to
vote in their country of origin by proxy, by post, at a consulate, or
by some other means.
This provision would ensure that Community citizens who, for example,
spent only two or three years in another Ivlember State retained their right
to vote in their country of origin. The !4ember States should therefore
incorporate into their national legislation the necessary provisions
guaranteeing all comrnunity citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote.
25. Present situation (European elections)
- Age: uniform (18), except for Greece (20)
- Residence (or domicile) and nationality requirements:
United Kingdom (Irish citizens resident in the United Kingdom hLso have
the right to vote).
Belgium (at least 5 months'domicile in the same commune required for
citizens voting for Deputies).
- NationalitY requirement onIY:
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands'
France and Greece
- Residence requirement onIY:
Ireland, and the Netherlands in particular circumstances, i.€. a foreign
national belonging to a Member state of the community who is deprived of
the right to vote in the country of which he is a national and resides
in the Netherlands, has the right to vote in the Netherlands.
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26. A<111;
Tha nrlnimum Bge of eligtbility ln the lndlvldual tilenbsr stateo af the
comunity ls ag followa s
eountry
.i.
nlnlmrfo aEe
Belglum 2l
Dennartc 18
Federal RePrrblLc of GetmanY 18
Franee 23
Ireland' 2L
rtaly 25
Luxembourg 2L
Netherlandg 25
united rtns{ou. 2L
27. Nationalitv of ca$lidatee
Each t{enDer state of the Cornnunlty rcgulres its canildatea for the
Europdan Pqrlianent to bc natlonalg of that country, eacept the united
Ki.ngdon, in which citizeng of, the lrLEh nepubllc are also el'lgible'
othert,ise,theonlydliffer€nc€oareinth@lengthoftlmenaturaliged
, cl.tizens muBt wait before they becouc ctlgtblel e.ll' t one year in the
rederal Rppuhllc of (;ermanYr Bnd ton y€ars in France'
28. Most llemLer sgatel rJo not requlre thelr eandiclateB to regide rn t-he
country they hop<' to.l€Prgsent' B€lglun and Luxembourg ane the
exceptions that do, while Denmark reguiree that iLs cindiclat'es s!^uld
reglde et least wlthln th€ Cotiltlunity'
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No provisionsAeeidence 
ln
nttional terri-
tory
x
-r--------<-!
,i
Residence
within
EEC
1Um
eral RoPubl'ic
!s:gEEeY:1--------
etherlanda
3c{-El[g{erE-.-
ce
29. Rolc of the EartIeB
In praetlee thg natlontl
Belglun and Franee, but
x
Naiional legtclatton olr aliglbil ity Bllotc tuir{eIy varylng loles to the
partiea, according to the hietorical backerorur.l of their electoral systelns'
In Dernrark, @er.'Italy dnd the,'tibtferliands, *t instanb, the fiational parties
alone are alloled to submlt llsts of candldnt*6 &U= electXone, while
Germany aleo permlts other polttlcal grouping# $t i'it aft" Community as a
psrtiee qlso draw 
"p tfrri,.lletg of candidatee in
thts t6 onty partly t.rud [*f r,uxembourg"
party lnfluenee ia weaker only in Ireland and ti*ti iUnitcd Kingdon' which
traditlonally allor lndivldual cand{.daclel and df'L" there ars no Party
lleta,whichgiveaevenlndcpcndentaachance.InrcstcaEegthechoice
of eandidates is left to the partt€e themsctv€E, Germany with lts
cmpulaory oeleetlon of Party candidatee by demOsratic proceBs belng the
exception.
It will Btr.a.'r, be clear that the polltical partles are the dominanf-
political fr)f,L.p in ,.he eelection of candldates. They are further helped
by the f,)rn,. . LteB der'erirred ln the n€xt section' which are far more
diffieul:, I 1nt :rrpOseible , c-ot tho rnde;rendent canCiclate tO handle
without t}.e i.cckir t of .' parLy orgAniZatlon'
It lB also wortl^ r,( ii.rrg 'hat the €stBbllshed polltical parties ean claim
certain prrvilpqeq t,y conparison w!,th new political groupinge, whieh are
eubjeet to r,,..the, rstrtctiona, Cl,ao deecribed in the next aeetion.
The establlehed pdtr LGa Lherefore enjoy a kind of nronopoly ln putLing
up eandldateo.
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30. Preliminary formalitiee
All YenLsr state8 requlre candid.rtes to b€ noml,nated in lieta primarily
or parL), I ines, apart from Ireland and the United Kingdom hrher€ the
candrda haee to !.: r,rrminated indivio,rally, and in Ireland mBy evcn
:rc;ni*aLe r nemsel ves -
The deadline for gubmitting the lists of candldateB also varlee. rn
,€1g1rrrrts ia 37.1a;s before the oleetion, in Germany 4?, in Luxembourg
50 and 'n rhe Netherlands 43, in Erance candidates rrust be nominated
by t'.e third frilay before elpcrlon day, and iD rrerand within eeven day6
of lhe IaBE date of publicatron of ' i lnourrce':''nL of the election,
ar"l ir. the unit€d Kingdon on a f6nr wrLhin 
€ight days of th€ cl.e^rion
):errrg called. In Greect. Llre d,_,,rdl r rre is l{ <tays.
rn rtBly, the liats have to b€ oubmitt€d 40 dlaya befor€ thc election,
but tha partlos' erectlon rymbola must b€ submlttcd 4g dlaye before.
By contrast, ln Denmark th€ llat8 of candldates need not b€ subnitt€d
r:ntil 25 daye before th€ election, exc€pt in the case of n€w parties,
r.'hich l^a'e to submit ttreir lists a full 5? daye before the electlons,
wrth 62-,00O signatures. Germanl, also imposes extra rcquirements on
new Da-ries, ccrpelling them to pr)duce eigrratures of at reast r% of the
F'-. 
'' 
('Falo, w1r h -l rnaXinrim of .,.4\t)tt pt,r Land, <rr 4,t)OO fof Ll,e lrcderal
' : .t,l rL as a wlrol,r. In Il-aIy, tlrr; l;st_s of eAr.d,daicg ,Or DcW fnt I ing
I ... tajn thc Si jr)a:',res of ',,)-. -,,r)r)(t voters r. each congtirue.1cl 
,
.' r' '-' LW" cotn-r., r'r,'ir each rc l{-n wit}rio the constituency. In L;:nece
. .-,,.artul.es pLr-
l,'ixenbourg, on r,,
Irst. ln llel.lrurr,
rembers oE parlr;.
: lccLoral i_.r,:rv.i.nce are requirerl 
.
't'll / llirttr'!, r(\/luLf'.s ltttt yggr.rlir ril,l.,ttUr(.s; [r)r ,.,1,.h
, 1,..t,; r,,(rr:1r,, t!tr, :ilrrlirturt.r; .,1,iilt.,r ltv(,
' ;,' ( ' t lrr: I arrgu.rgo .Ir.rul) tn (Juo.ii lorr or at lcast
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Indlvldual.e
x x
x
I
x x.
x
x
x
x I-
x
x
11000 noterg for €ach electoral province for whrch there are candidateE.
In thc Unit€d Kingdlon r nomination requir€s the siqrrature of only 3O
votera. but a d€posit of 8600. Ireland requrres a depogit of EIRIrI,r000
per candldat€, r€turnable if he obtaing ov€r one third of the voter:
r€quired for election. France requir€s a clepoalt of FF 100,000 per lietr
returnable lf over 5% of the vot€s aro obtalned. The Netherlande
requires that each list, xhich I'aa to b€ signed by 25 votere, be accomp-
anied by a depo8lt of 18,000 grurlo.rs, except where 1r -s a !1s' ,:' ,
political groupi-rg holding one or more seats in the European parliarnent.
In Greece a iepo$it of Dr I5OrO0O is required for each list but
there are no requirerrElrts as to signatures.
Candidature llAdditiontel reguiremento
lndividually iltgo. cf ,*
lls rgnatures
ll v
---[----3.
X [ *-----
9el:rise-------
Federal Republlc
9!-9erE3!v------
France
Greece
!ergElgslg--
Netherlands
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X. . ELECTION DAY
3L Natlon-al-$9.t ig1tg
The day of th. week on whlclr (Ic'llerrt 1 r' t |,r'Llc.'n8 I rL' ht'ld is I'r i'rj i 'tr''
by lav ln tlte followlng lrlcnbor Stittt's:
Belg'.;n , FLtrr'l'rY f:lecEornl l'vr
Feclq r r I Repuhli c of Sunday Fedo'ral elec u, r.'t' I law
Get.malry
1,r.1*,^rr sunil.ry Law No. 55
Grl)a,.'e S rri.'r taf tjle''toral l:tvl
Luxcmbourgsunrl'lyl,awof2?JuIy1956
Netherlands l{erlr'esday Eleetora I law
In the f,ollowlng tllenber states elacrlon 6ay Ie determlned by traditfon!
Dennark
Ire i and
r taly
United Klngdon
7.)- Errropean elect tons
normally Tuesday
Tuesday, Wedne8day 0{l, Thureday by tradition
Siuntlay and llondaY lsdUdtng
Thursday bY tradltldW
Arttcle 9 of the Act of the Councll, of 20 Septer,rh*L fgZg provldee that:
,1. Electlons to the Aseembly Ehall be held on the date flxed by each
Menber state, for all llenber stateB thiE date shall fall wtthln
the same perlod Etarctng on the Ttrursday notnlng and endlng on
,l
the folloirlng SundaY.
2, The countlng of votes may not begtn untll after the olose of poll'ing
tn the Member state whose glectors are Ehe last to vote wtthln the
perlod refrrrretl to tn prrgsraph I ' I
In Article 9 of the draft. conventlon whtch lt adopted on 14 January 1975
t-he EuroPean Parllanrent ,proposed that:
,1. n:lecttons to the Srtooo* Parllanent ehall be hel.d on the same
;lay 1n aIl. t4..'r'Der Statea
?-. Any Member qtBte may, however, dectde to hold the electlons one
r.. t' eurller r later than the flxed date or to spread them over i
I ro conqecutlve dayo lncludlng ttlat day
The rnt6tirr,-1y long pertOd chogen by the Counell wae lntended tO rneetr -
, ,e requlrcmenta of Ehoso countrles accugtomed to vote on a Tgrking day rather
i''&n on a Sunday ln.thelr natlonal general sleatlong.
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Thus ttre electors "t ::H:::
Ttre Netherlande
and t-he Unlted Klngdom
Hent to the PoIIE on Thursd!!-l Jyng' ln lhe five oEhnr He'nilrcr strl('s
vottng took place on Slndav'!0- June'1979'
The Iong period of tirre whleh elapred between the elosing :f polling
stationst.l.lTJunearrdl0Junl'|crea!6,r.1D.!n6lclerabtredifflcrrlttesitrvjq''w::f
the fact tfiat Artlcle') l2l <,f Lhc Corrrreil Aet of 1976 r'xPress'l y prohlbi'Led
thecountlngofvotesuntllpolllngh.rrlc]osedlnallthetlemberStates.
These cliff lcultlee lncluded:
(a) technlcal Problerns relating
June and keePlng them under
to sr'.rl.ing the bal l'ot boxes on 7
lock and key untlJ 10 June:
It'l the (rxtra eost {nvolvc'd 1n Payinq bhe staf l' rc'sponstble for
..outttlprgvotceortsunttayr.vcrtillr,;.rhdtnpartit:ul.trvoLcscast
srr Eht, Thursday wk'lch but for the Councll Act wou]d have beert
(.:ctunted on Fri daY ;
(c) thr' fact tl'tat' for r'elrgloue and flnanclal reasonB some countries
'o' Eome areag of certaln countrles) dtd not begln cquntlng votes
uni,J MonduY nornlng
(dlt\ec]Jtficultiesencounteredbythemcdlalnmaintainlnglnterest
,flrr I su:iday and Honday rn the results of the ereetlons whrch had
benn teld ln four coulrtrlesl on the previous Thursday'
\:-hortelvotlngperlodwouldhavegreatadvantagesbothforthe
technlcalreagongdlscussedaboveandalso-whtchlsveryimportqnt-in
order,ofccu8andstlnulateinterestlnLheelectlons.Itwouldtherefore
seem necessary to have the possibtllty of, organlzlng the ballot:
(a) an a sunday aE happened ln slx out of the ten Member States'
(b)ona.worklngdayashappenedlnfouroutofthetenl.lenberstat.es
oc rhe four, counErles ln whlch the ballot wa6 held on Thursday 7 June
|g1g,rn]ytrotradttlonatlyvotedonaThursdayandinoneofthem,Ireiand.,
electiL'ns ere held ,etther on a Tuasday' Wednesday or Thursday' 
Denmark
andthe.thorlant]swereobllgedltovoteonaThursdayinsteadofaTuesday
aEisusualinDenntar:kar.rlaWcdnesdays6lsusuallntheNetherlande.It
;rr,p€arg 3596 the dlscusstone whlch took place at the t.ime wlth|n rhe Coune|I
Accountln,, tol 77 mllllon people, 1'€' 30t the CorulunitY.o€
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that there vrag n6 rq,rte'' ial f1 'rllOtl for Lh"8e
to vote on a Monday l:. tr"6Y wer': :rltpared
lt would be posslbl,' to DL!tsuade tlre Unlred
lrlcnday ltr European eloetlona'
two countries and Ireland not
to vote on a HondaY PerhaPs
Klngdom also to vote on a
Dectelon of
Parllanent
Concl us lon
-.--
It night be
held on a $m{ay
I
I
,,1 ' I t v..ttious iysteltlE
I'l !( , !,r, , i V<l(.';tltt.'y OCeUfflng
i.c r' rnr'nr,ef i
&sirable to propose that d{regt elections sho-uld
and l{onday AP t}ru bEgiruiing of-.,rune }984 
.-
be
xI. v4g-lu]t. 3!419.
3 3 . N ;-!;17'r.a.!_ a1g9.t.19ui
/\( f.rt''rs natlonal eleCtlons in the tan Menrber States are eoncerned'
r,rr'.31'(- ' sr. t lalls vacant, by-oloctlorts are held ln rrance' Ireland and
L' : i, r i,.t^ -(irgdcm. In Belglum the vae. nr eeaL ls f i lled bY an alLernate
,,rd . 1, r.,hr:i sjx Menber states by ttrc next candtdat.e on the Ilst of the
'.,.-. t' 'r ' " nember uhose seat hag fallen vaeant'
of 61()ctoral Lsw aPplylng to European
between European eleettons le fllled ln the
Next on
Llst
!(. Ir:ril Republlcj" :':'''"].']:
l' r.rflr'r'
(.ir t'CC€
II Lrr..l I and
L:i,t
| 
-.1"'
.,'1r rr.!tl.9
' ,rcls
i ili.ngdom
- 22'-
|- ,,,,
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35. Conclusion
If a proposal for a uniform procedure is submitted providing
that members shalI be elected by proportional representation in
regional or national constituencies vacant seats could be filled
by the next unsuccessful candidate on the tist of the party of the
previous Member.
There does not seem to be any valid objection to the harmonization
of the ten Mernllr.r St ittcs' proviriions on thisr tlucstion.
XI I. PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE ELECTORAL CAIUPAIGN
36. For the purpose of national elections, these provisions cover
the financing by the State of political parties' election campaign
expenses, restrictions on election campaign expenses as respects
parties or individuals, th€i duration of the campaign, provisions on
broadcasting time, the free provision of certain forms of practical
assistance in connection with the election etc. The following
provisions apply to the European elections:
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Derunark
The t,art j,:s roceivctr," l[, io,lr'""iiJld1"f,':;l; fl:i3"#i:l*u..
-ffi J ffi ::f H"i"h,"ltpoii*F--(DM 3.5 per vo,s).
OPINION OF THE LEGAI AFFATRS COI\IMITTEE
Draftsman : Mr. F. D'ANGELOSAIiTE
The Legal Affairs Committee was asked for its opinion on
the uniform electoral system on 5 october 1981.
On 2 October 1980, pending formal consultation, the Lega1
Affairs Committee had already appointed Mr D'Angelosante
draftsman of an opinion on the draft convention, petition No.1/79
concerning British representation in the first directly elected
European Parliament (PE 59.759) and petition No. 9/19 concerning
the right to vote for British citizens living in France (PE 59.833).
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings
of 22-23 September and 26-27 October 1981; the opinion was adopted
by 9 votes to 1 with 4 abstentions at the latter meeting.
Present: Mr Ferri, chairman; wlr Luster, Mr Turner and
I"1r Chambeiron, vice-chairmeni Mr D'Angelosante, draftsman of the
opinion; tvlrs Cinciari Rodano, l,1r Dalziel, Mr Donnez, Ivlr Fischbach,
Mr Goppel, l"1r Janssen van Raay, Mr Modiano, I,1r Prout,
Ivlr Sieglerschmidt, Mr TyrreIl and Mr Zecchino (dePutizing for
Ivlr Gonella).
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I. INTRODIrcTION
1. The election of the European parliament by direct unLvergal
suffrage is provided for by Articles 2l(3) of th€ Ecsc rreaty, r3g(3)
of the EEc rreaty and 108(3) of the EAEC rreaty. These clauseg, which
are identical, stipulate that 'the Asseilb1y shall draw up proposals for
elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform
proeedure in all Member States'. Once Parliament has fulfil-Ied this
requirement, the Council must, ,acting unanimously, lay down the
appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member States for
adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements' .
2. The first of these clauses confers on the European parliament a
po\.rer of initiative of manifest poriticar iruportance. rndeed, the
provision requiring the eLection of the Members of the European parLiament
by direct universal suffrage is the only clause in the Treaties which
vests the parliamentary Instit,ution with a power of initiative. parliament
first acted to give effect to this provision in 1950, when it adopted a
resolution 'concerning the approrral of the draft convention on the election
of the Parliamentary Assembly by direct universal suffrage,l.
The council, however, failed to give the necessary folrow-up to
Parliament's proposar by adopting, as it was obriged to do, the measures
required for the elections to take place. On the contrary, tt ctiit nothing
in response to Parliament's initiative. On that occasion, therefore, it
was clearly the Council that defaulted on its obligations.
Parliament, for its part, repeatedl_y urged the other Institution to
futfil its responsibilities and take the necessary action. Howeven, the
Council continued to be t,otally unresponsive and on 28 Oetober L97I the
President-in-Office of Parliament therefore request,ed two distinguishedjurists 
- Professors Costantinesco (Saarbriicken) and Kovar (SErasbourg-
Nancy) - to give their views on the possibility of bringing an action against
the Council for failure to act, within the meaning of Articte 175 of the
Treaty. The president informed parLiament of this requeat2.
10, of 2.6.Lg6o, p. 834
2see pE 30.050,/Ann. of 26.5.Lg72
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The opinion of these experts was that an appeal against the Council
was possible, but that it should be considered as an alternative to
continued efforts to resolve the problem in cotlaboration with the
Council: only one or other of the two courses of action was practicable,
in ot'her words, if Parliament opted for a legal battre, it would forfeit.
any further chance of settling the matter through the normal negotiat.ing
Proces9es.
3. In a resolution dated 14 January L975 parliament, adopt,ed a new
draft convention on the election of the Members of the European Parliament
by direct universal suffragel.
The subsequent 'Act concerning the eleetion of the representat,ives
of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage', which was adopted by the
Council by decision of 20 Septemb er L9762, took up a number of the
proposals contained in this draft convention. Indeed, the Act incor-
porates its most important provisions, vlz. those relating to the duration
of the mandate (Article 3), the principle of the personal vote and the
exclusion of the binding mandate (Article 4), the compatibility of the
European mandate with the national manilate (Article 5) and the various
cases of incompatibility (Article 6), etc.
4. With the adoption of this convention, then, Parliament exercised a
genuinely 'constituent power'by virtue of the task conferred on it by
the Treaties. In 1975, however, this power could not be exercised
correctly, since it was not as wide as that envisaged by the Treaties.
Of particular signifieance in this connection is the change Lo the
statutory process that resulted in deferment of the introduction of the
uniform electoral procedure to a later stage.
As we know, the Treaty provides for two stages: a first stage,
cluring which the Members of Parliament are designated by their respective
Parliaments in accordance with the 'procedure laid down by eaeh l,{edber
State'3; and a second stage, during which the direct eleetion of the
Members of Parliament and the application of a uniform electoral
procedure are required to take place at one and the same time. The
1975 draft convention and the 1975 Act separated the two events,
loJ tto. c 32 of
2oJ No. L 278 of
3arti.I" 2L(L) of the ECSC Treaty, Article
and Article 108 (1) of the EAEC Treaty
- 
2'7-
138(1) of the EEC Treaty
LL.2.1975, p.1-5
8.r0.1976
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authorizing the imrnediate election of the European parliament and
delaying the formulation of a uniform el-ectoral procedure. This delay,
which seems totally at rzariance with the provisions of the Treaty,
will not continue indefinitely, since the Act of September 1976 requires,
the rules governing the uniform electoral lrrocedure to be adopted during
the first legislative term of the elected Parliament, so that it can be
applied at the tine of the second European electionsl.
II. TIIE CONCEPT OF IINIFORIT{ PR@EDIIRE'
5. As we have seen, Parliament is required under the Treaties to draw
up 'proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance
with a uniforrr procedure in all Islember states,2. parriament is thus
bound by the statutory provisions cited above and, all things considered,
it is clearly in its best interests to see to their irnplementation. rf
it has not yet done so, it is not because the Treaties are open to a
different interpretation or because a legal basis exists for a different
opinlon. The reaL reason is bound up with the assessment that was made
of what was politically feasible and desirable. It is not our intention
here to discuss this assessment, even if it was quite mistaken at the tirne
and is today altogether indefensibte.
6- This conclusLon is in no way influenced by the hair-splitting arguments
that took place over the degree of uniformity of the electoral- procedure
required under the Treaties, the main reason being that not even those
who e:<pregsed doubts about the matter believed that the 1975 draft convention
had introduced, even Partially, a uniform electoral procedure. In any case,
aer qre have already seen, both that draft and the subsequent Act of the
council expressry deferred implementation of the uniform procedure.
A further reason is that what this procedure involves is sufficiently
clear and does not pose any particul-ar difficulties as regards interpretation.
rndeed, if interpreted literally, the contradict,ion between the concept of
'procedure laid down by each lylember State' (Article l3B(l-)) and the concept
of 'uniform procedure in all ltlember States' (Article 138(3)) is only apparent
gince, with the introduction of the uniform procedure, the procedures of the
individual States would be superseded.
From a logical viewpoint, it is inconcei'nble that a uniform electoraL
system Ehould be based on a multiplicity of legal sourees, except where the
constitutionally competent source delegates to other institutional bodies
the power to formulate certain aspects of the procedure. Here, horvever,
lsee Article 72Arti.l. 2r(3) of the EcscArticle 108(3) of the EAECTreaty, ArticLe f3B(3) of the EEC Treaty andI Treaty
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it is clear that all the statutory provisions derive from the one competent
souree and the fact that. certain powers have been delegated does noL diminish
Lhe competence and the legitimacy of that source: rather they confirm and
reinforee it.
As we have said, then, the interlocutory choice expresses a political
option as to the desirability and possibility of pursuing a particular
course of action, which, in our opinion, is now no longer admissible.
7. It vras preferred, then, to conduct the first direct. elections on the
basis of the individual national systems, and these took place from 7 to
9 June L979. The European Parliament is now preparing to give full
effect to Art,icle 138(3) of the EEC Treaty by drawing up a draft, convention
on the uniform electoral procedure for the election of the representatives
of the European Parliament.
8. In performing this task Parl-iament must proceed on the basis of the
present rul-es, i.e. those contained in the Act of 2O September, which
stipulates that 'the electoral procedure shall be governed in eaeh Member
State by its national provisions' (Article 7(2)). The Aet, of 20 September
1976 constitutes, by its very nature, a transitional stage for which there
is no provision in the Treaties, which specify solely that there is to be
a transition from a Parliament whose }ilembers are designated by their respective
national Parliaments to a European Parliamentary Institution composed of
representatives elected on the basis of a 'uniform procedure'.
It is plain that the national l-aws enacted for the election of the
Members of the European Parliament have not had the effect of instituting
a uniform electoral procedure; rather they have held fast, to the principles
applicable to the national elect,oral procedure 
- a fact of which the authors
of the 1975 convention and the Act of 20 September L976 were fully conscious.
III. PRINCIPI;ES THAT It{UST BE WRITTEN IIfIO THE CONVETVIION
9. Since the Act annexed to the Council Decision of 20 September L976 is
largely based on the draft convention adopted by Parliament in L975,
introducing a provisional stage preparatory to the entry into force of a
convention that must give fulI effect to Art,icle 138(3) of the Treaty, the
new convention will necessarily have to reguJ-ate, ag far as possible, alJ-
matters connected with the introduction of a uniform electoral procedure.
All the provisions which, being mainly of an executive nature and
consisting primarily of adminj.strative acts, continue to be ent,rusted to the
individual Member States, wiIl, of course, be excluded: the keeping of
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electoral lists, particulars relating to poll cards and the tirne of their
issue, the nomination of members of the electoral offices, eLc.
10. The uniform electoral procedure must on no account betray any
incongistencies, i.e. reveal errors in the main areas of choice that
might be reflected in the composition of the Assembly. It is essential
to estabLish the vital principJ.e that electoral rules are no longer
admissible which, while promoting the interests of a particular State or
even of a particular national party, damage and weaken parliament by
distorting its representativeness.
It may be the case that the Members from a small Stat,e represent far
fewer electors than the nunber necessary for the el-ection of lr{embers from
larger and more populous States, but this situation arises beeause
Farliament (and eubsequently the Council) congidered the presence of
representatives of all the States to be necesrstary. Ilowever, there must
not (or should not) be a situation in which, taking adrrantage of the
agreement not to decide on a uniform electoral procedure, some Member
States substantially ehange their parliamentary representation so that the
ratio between Parliament's Members and groups is thrown out of balance.
It should not be forgotten that, in the last analysis, the body that
l-s most interested in having a ballanced electoral system is the Assembly
itself (hence, perhaps, the constituent po\^rer conferred upon it), since
Lt would have to suffer the consequences of equivocal legislat,ive decisions
regarding the appointment of its Members.
11. The new convention should therefore propose, with reference to the
Act of 20 September L976, the rules on the basis of which the Members of
the European Parliament will be elected. No reference to national laws
will be necessary. The fundamental- principle underlying these rules could
be wordecl as follosrs:
'The representatives to the European Parliament shall be elected
in all the Medber States in accordance with a uniform procedure
instituted pursuant to Article 2L(3) of the ECSC Treaty, Articre
138(3) of the EEC Treaty and Article 108(3) of the EAEC Treaty.
This procedure is defined in this convention,.
L2. The age at which persons beeome eligible E,o vote is the same in all
the Member States (18 years). The convention could contain a clause which
establishee thie as a general principle for the European elections as well.
This elause would necessarily have to be accompanied by a provision concerning
the exercise, of the right, to stand for erection. rn the first European
elections the age requirement differed in accordance with national lawg,
with the minimum age ranging from 18 years (Denmark and cermany) to 25 years(Italy and the Netherlancls).
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The convention should fix the same age limit for all the Member
States, because any differentiation between candidates in terms of age,
apart from being a potentially distorting factor in the election resultn
would constitute a form of discrimination between candidates of different,
nationality.
The convention could therefore provide as follows:
'A11 citizens of the Member StaLes who have reached 18 years
of age shall have the right to vot,e' .
13. As regards the right to stand for election, since the age limit,
varies under national law, the convention could fix the same age for all
the Member States , for example 18 years:
'A11 citizens of the Itlember States who have reached 18 years
of age shall be eligible to sLand for election to the European
Parliament' .
L4. Naturalty, the conditions laid down by national legislation for the
exercise of these rights would remain in foree, and this could be covered
by the following provision:
'The exercise of the right to vote in elections and to st,and
for election may be prohibited or suspended in the case of
persons whose conduct is such that the national laws reguire
their name to be deleted from the registers of elect,ors,
provided that such conduct is legaIIy established in the
manner specified by those laws'.
15. A further problem that should be examined is the exercise of Uhe
right to vote outside the State of which the elector is a citizen. The
new convention should specify that the attribution of the right to vote
in the European elections is a concept that cannot accommodate the
existing discrepancies in the national laws concerning the rights of
citizens who reside or do not reside in the national territory. The
convention should therefore make it obligatory for all the Member States
to guarantee the right of all their citizens to vote in the EuroPean
elections, while providing suitable centres for this purPose.
The convention should therefore stipulate that:
'The citizens of the Member States who are resident in anoLher
Member State shall exercise their right to vote without
restriction. The Member States shall adopt all the measures
necessary to ensure that they are able to exercise the right to
- 
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vote at diplomatic missions or at other places that afforcl
equirral.ent guarantees. In addition, the SLates in which the
electors are resident shalI provide alL the assietance necessary
to ensure the freedom and secreey of voting and to prevent
negative consrequences of any kind for the electors and the
members of the electoral_ offices'.
L6. As regards the citizenship of candidates, the right to stand for
election should be granted by the Member States to all their citizens,
irrespective of their place of residenee. rn this connection, the new
convention shoul-d provide that all the compulsory preliminary formalities
concerning the nomination of candidates may also be compJ-eted at the
diplomatic migsions of each State in the other Member States, at wtrich the
necestsary facilities would be provided.
Special probJ-ems are created, hovrever, by the deposit that is required
l-n four llember states (France, rreland, the Netherlands and the united
Kingdom), whereas in the other six States nominations must be supported by
a mLnimum number of signatures. If candidates of rrarious nationalities
resident in a State other than their own are to enjoy equirralent rights,
the rules here should be standarilized and they should not be different from
those applied to candidates resident in the nationar territory.
The eonvention should therefore incLude a clause standardizing the
procedures for the completion of the compulsory prelininary formalities by
all those eJ.igible to stand for election. This clause could be drafted
along the following lines:
'Irrespective of their place of residence, the citizens of the
lllember States may Prestent their candidature for the election to the
European Parriament, provided that their eligibility to stand is not
precluded under national Iaw by offenees or other IegaIIy established
facts requiring the deletion of their names from the electoral lists.
The list of the parties anil groups presented in the European
Parriament and/or ln the respective national parriaments sharl be
submitted, directly or through an authorized agent, by the national
secretary or the president of the party or group concerned. The
other lists must be submitted by not less than 25rooo erectors
incruded on the registers of electors of the Member state of which
the candidates are citizens. Deposits shall not be required for
the election to the European parliament,.
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L7. The foregoing provisions give some indication of one of the
central objectives which ought to be pursued if a uniform elect,oral
procedure is to be successfully instituted: the introduction throughout
the Conununity of single nationaL lists that are valid for the entire
constituency, each constituency being made up of one Member State.
This arrangement may be considereil as an alternative to that of
a single list for the entire Community territory, a solution which,
although far preferabLe to all others because it is the most homogeneous,
would nonetheless pose serioub difficulties, e.g. it would require the
individual lt{ember States to dismantle the present structures, based on
national conditions, within which they operate - which would have a
far-reaching effect on the existing national parties.
IV. ESSEISTIAL ELEIIIETiITS OF A I'NIFORIVI ELECTORAL SYSTEM
18. We have nov, come to the nub of the problem: by U.miting our
options to the assumptions and proposals aclvanced earlier, we exclude
the other possible arrangement, with which the party-Iist election
systems - and, indeed, any other such system - are incompat,ible: the
majority eLection system.
There would seem to be no doubt (and no-one, in our Assembly, has so
far tried seriousJ-y and objectively to deny it) that the proportional
system is by far superior to the other systern, if only because of the
historical fact that the majority system, which earlier was almost
universaLJ-y applieil, has now been repJ-aced almost everlnrrhere by the
proportional system. Arising from historieal developments, from the way
teaclership groups have evolved and from the increasing spread of the
democratic system, the electora-I expression of this unquestionably
positive change has been the choice of proportionality over the najority
system that was earlier in force. Consequently, the electoral reform,
because it is an expression of these favourable developments, must also
be regarded as an improvement.
19. It has to be recognized that in some of the Member States there
have been changes in the opposite direction, in other words, a return
from the proportional to the majority system.
In the first pIace, however, this 'reversion' hag generally been
part of a total transformaLion of the poJ-itical system of the country
concerned, which hag had to face radical changes in the role of the
parties and in that of Parliament, whereas the same developments have
not occurred in those countries in which the 'pure' majority sysLem
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is defended at all costs. rn addition, such a change of system has been
found to be justified by the need to strengthen the executive at a
specially difficult time in a particular country's history.
such a need does not arise in the community institutions, since
there is no Community 'government,' which ig answerable to parLiament and
which has therefore to be sustained by large and effective najorities.
On the contrary, the nature of the Community ingtitutional- system
is altogether different, as, indeed, is the role of parliament.
20. We referred earlier to the constituent power vested in parliament
by Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty, a povrer that it is noly exercising in
its deliberations on the draft convention on direct elections. Compared
to the other Powers conferred on the Assembly, this is an exceptionally
important one, which probably derives from the fact that parliament has a
greater interest than the other institutions in the eLectoral- system by
which it will ultimately be re-shaped.
Throughout its existence parliament has always sought to use bhe
fact of its representativeness in terms of nationalities and political
groupings to the best possibre advantage: suffice it to say, in this
connection, that considerable importance has always been attached to the
function of the political groups.
In order to ensure that all the nationalities are substantially
represented, mechanisms have rightry been introduced to increase the
number of I,lembers erected from the sma]-ler countries. The afun of the
Rules of Procedure, and more especialJ-y of parliamentary practice, is to
achieve a balance - not always perfect but always sought after 
- between
nationalities and political groups.
2L. rn studying a possible uniform electorar syst"rl, ah" corunittee
responsible has drawn attention to the existence of ideal systems, which
would be neither proportional nor majority systems but would combine
elements of the two (hybrid systems).
An appraisal of the examples given suggests that some of them would
be quite inappropriate, since 'it is easier to ssuare the circle than to
te a uni ctoral ich
with the maioritv one,2. Indeed, hardly any of the hybrid systems
lmy Mr J. seirlinger
Committee, on the basic elements of a
^ 
(PE 64.569/rev.Ivl .zsee speech by Mr Mario Scelba duringNo. 185, Januaxy L975, p. 62.
on behalf of the political Affairs
uniform electoral system
the sitting of L4.L.L975 - Debates
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describedl would be satisfactory.
observations are called for:
In this connection, the following
(a) For elections to the Italian Senate the single-member majority
system applies onry in constituencies in which a candidate obtains
at least 65% of the votes cast; if no candidate secures this
percentage, all the rules of the proportional system are applied.
It appears that in the past this condition has been fulfilled in
four or five constituencies (315 senators are elected in ltaly).
For some legislative periods (at least since 1963) thig has
happened in one or two cases only. We may conclude, therefore,
that these are insignificant exceptions to the rule of
proportionality;
Even if provision is made for the allocation of some seats in
single-member congtituencies, the system of election to the Bundestag
of the Federal Republic of Germany is in fact a proportional system
(the only limitation being t'he 5% electoral threshold), since all
the seats are allotted in accordance with the d'Hondt method, which
is typical of the proportional system. The sole purpose of the
meehaniem described in the abovementioned document is to give Lhe
elector a choice between several candiclates;
(c) The system applied in Ireland pursues the same goal and is therefore
a proportional system;
(d) For elections to Lhe French Nat.iona1 Assembly the single-member,
majority system is used, with adjustments being required by the
introduction of two ballots, during the second of which the number
of candidates is reduced by statutory provision, normally to two.
22. Ilowever, as we have said, these examples are totally inappropriate,
both because of the inaccuracy of the claim that they typify the 'hybrid
system' and because they are relatively unimportant to the discussion in
progress 
-
In all the countries we have been considering, there is a marked
difference between the system that was used for electing the European
Parliament and that useil for elections to the national parliaments.
Italy used a simple vote-by-list proportional system. The Federal
Republic of Germany and France used a similar proportional system, adjusted
to include the 5% threshold clause. I*ith the exception of the United
Kingdom, all the other Member States adopted proportional electoral systems,
lpn oa.se9./rev rv, p. L2 et paesim
(b)
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in some casesr adjusted to include the clause eliminating lists receiving
fewer than 5% of the votes cast. If, therefore, the object was to
obtain an 'average' from the 'basket'of regulations in force, the
reference data, and hence the conclusion, would hdve to be dLfferent.
23. The uniform procedure should therefore be geared to proportional
representation, which, as we have seen, is already very widely used under
national electoral law.
The procedure should be completely uniform. This, apparently,
would not have been the view of the members of the working party, chaired
by Ivlr Dehousse, which drew up the clraft conventLon for the direct
election of the European Parliament that was adopted by the Assedbly on
17 August 1950 but not followed up by the Council.
The short study containing 'a compendium of the detaiLed studies
carried out bv the workinq partv appointed bv the Assedb1v,l maintains
that the term 'uniform procedure' should be interpreted as meaning
'an electoral law that is fundamentallv the same in all the Meilber States,2,
and then goes on to assert that 'uniformitv is not svnonvmous with
identicalness. It will thus be possible for the convention to lav dotrn
uniform rules, even if some differences continue to exist between the
national implementinq laws' 3.
Even if these viewg are endorsed 
- and they are not endorsed in
this opinion - it has to be acknowLedgd that they do not permit substantiaL
differences of the kind associated with the eleetoral eystem (proportional
representation or the najority system).
rt is easy to refute these opinions, if onry because they were ueed
by the authors to defend their draft convention, in which they accepted
the proposal contained in Article 138(3) of the EEc rreaty, srrbject to
the corrections which they considered to be justifiecl.
24. In 1960, then, Parliament clecided that direct elections and the
uniform electoral- procedure should be deatt wiLh as entirely separate
issues. This decision was totally contrary to the letter of the Treaty,
had no legal justification and was motivated solely by reasonEt of political
expediency. It was nevertheless maintained in the draft convention of
1975 and the council Act of L976.
lEoropu"r, Parriamentary Assembly: Tovrards the direct election of the
European Parliamentary Assembly 
- October 1960
2rd"*, page 27
3rd.rn, page 28
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The authors of the first draft convention were evidently convinced
that 'the concept of atransitionalstage, which is not mentioned in the
Treaties, has made it possible to surmount difficulties for which tlrere
could be no immediate solution'I. Apart from craiming, as we have seen,
that the electoral procedure could be less than completely uniform, the
authors of the 1960 draft based their opinion on the legitimacy and
practicability of a transitional stage on the assumption that, in drawing
up the eonvention on the direct election of parliament, Lhey were in
effect proposing a reform of the Treaty.
This is clearly stated, and the causes and the consequences are just
as clearly stated. The 1960 working party says that 'it should be made
clear that the working party has not kept too strictly to the Letter of the
Treaties. Since its brief was to review the various options, it did not
feel that the arguments deriving from a literal reading of the texts should
take strict precedence over considerations of a political nature,2.
This attitude vras arso taken by the authors of the 1975 draf!, who
even went so far as to recommend that Article 138(3) of the Treaty of Rome
should be deleted3.
There can be no doubt that this approach, which undoubtedly
eonstituted the 1egal basis of the limited and transitionaL decisions
taken at the time, was totally wrong, since the proposals drawn up by
Parliament and the subsequent del-iberations by the council, far from
recommending an amendment of the Treaties, actually fol]ow them to the
Ietter. Nor can there be any doubt that the provisions of the Treaties
are binding and not open to debate.
25. rn 1975 and 1976 att.empt.s were made to remedy this bratant
infringement of the Treaties. As we have seen, parliament even proposed
that the relevant Treaty provisions should be rescinded and that the
convention and the resulting Act should instead constitute the regulations
governing direct elections. This proposal was not accepted.
In adopting the 197G AcL the Counej_I, for its part, annulled the first
two paragraphs of Article 138 of the EEc Treaty and gave the future elected
Assembly the task of drawing up a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure,
while stipulating that, pending the entry into force of that procedure,
'the electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its
national provisions' (see Article 7 of the Act) .
lTowards the direet election, p. 292rd"*, p. 2a
3see Article 15 (1) of the draft convention.
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This ruling was widely interpreted to mean that the work of
drawing up a uniform electoral procedure should be completed during the
presrent legislative term. The Assedbly formally accepted this
interpretation, specifying that Parliament 'shall draw up a proposal
for a uniform electoral system by 1980 at the lategt' (Article 7(1) of
the draft convention).
Be that as it may, it is certain that Parliament and the Council
must now confine their attention to the task of drawing up a uniform
electoral procedure, because the power to decide on national procedures
is vested in the individual Dlember States and because, with the repeal
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty, the basic
principles on which further Legislation can be built are nohr J.acking.
Moreover, it is clear that there are two stages and not more: the
national electoral procedures and the uniform procedure. This suggests
the following conelusiong:
in conducting the present debate,
conferred on it by the Act of 20
its proposals must relate to the
Parliament is fulfilLing the mandate
September L976;
uniform electoral proceduret
in fulfilling this mandate, Parliament cannot introduce further
intermediate'stages' .
26. In the light of these conclusions, the suggestion that it is
unnecessary to introduce a fully uniform electoral procedure is unacceptable.
Ivloreover, the view that the uniform procedure can be arrived at 'in several
1stages'- is mistaken, since it has no legal basis and, as we have Eeen,
is invalidated by the relerrant provisions.
It is worth pointing out in this connection that, accorcling to the
authors of the first draft, 'the introduction of the concept of a tran-
sitional period has made it possible to overcome the many diffieulties
arising from the conflict between an ideal conception of the nature of the
t,asks of the elected Parliamentary Assembly and the need to take account
of the difficulties and the exigencj.es of the political situation'2.
It has to be realized, however, that at the time this was written the
political problems encountered sprang from substantial differences in the
attitude of the Member States to the European Economic Comnunity (which,
however, does not justify the view that they were entitled to ignore the
Lext of the Treaty). Today, hovrever, the l{ember states are apparentry
ISee PE 54.569/rev. rv, page 9
2Towards the direct electiorlr p. 11
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being forced to seek a legarry indefensi.ble compromise to satisfy the
needs (which are neither cLearry e:rplained nor comprehensil:je) of a
single l,lember State.
Furthermore, the opinion put fonrrard in the document now before the
Political Affai.rs committee runs counter to the basic Treaty provisions,
not only as regards the proposed procedure, but aLso ag regards the
content of the electoral sy"teml.
After claiming that it will be possible to introduce the uniform
erectoral procedure gradually, the draft report under consideration
suggests that, as a first step, the proposals to be submitted for a
uniform procedure shourd rerate onry to the erectora!_sJsteE, the riqht
to vote and the riqht to stand for election.
Ilo\,rever, presumably to avoid confusion, the electoral system
(which should be identified with the electoral proeedure and is, in any
case, by far the most important part of it) is funnediately after*rards
defined in terms that dirninish its importance and have no legal basis.
27. An electoral system whieh I l-d re Ie ible the
moders tried in the individual states and trusted bv their citizens,
is not a uniform system. Perhaps it should be, but that is a moot point.
However, given the differences between the systems used in the rrarious
States, which, when compared, seem almost j-mpossible to reconcile, to
claim that the uniform electoral sysLem should meet sush criteria ie
Lantamount to preventing its introduction.
fhen there is no e:<planation why the general and rather \ftrgue
objective of 'ensurinq that egual weiqht attaches to each vote,3 should
be preferred to the principle of ,one man ore vote,.
Equally incomprehensible is the reason for proposing that represen-
tation in Parliament should be limited to the 'main political forceg'.
This proposal is purposely vague becauge, as we have seen, some of the
national- eLectoral laws tend to promote limited representation, if onty
by adopting a vote-by-rist proportional system incorporating the 5%
threshold crause, which is unacceptably discriminatory, even though it
affects a smalI number of candidateg. Hovrever, the legislation of one
Member State virtually guaranteeEr representation for the two main parties
onIy, since it operatest an exclusion threshold that is almost three ti.nes
higher than that of the other systems and thus strikes a blow at firmly
1
-see PE 64.569/xev. IV, p- IO
2__Idem
3_ _Idem
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estabrished and well supported parties which are dury recognized by
influential groups within our parlianent.
2a. Apart from the problems of politicar assessment ralsed by this
proposal in the report under consideration, there are other probrems
of a legal nature.
We are familiar with the difference between parties admitted to
elections and parties represrented on the basis of the selective mechanigms
operated by the erectoral system. But, when the representation of the
two leading parties is asgured in adrnnce and aIl- the other parties are
excluded, the two concepts are Likely to becolne confused. rf the
mechanigms proposed in the tr.ro alternative systems put forrmrd for
discussion by the comnittee responsible were intended solely to engure
that in one of the Menber states representation continued to be
restricted to the two leading partl-es, it is obvlous that the excluded
parties would be faced, not onLy with the probJ-em of their representation'
in Parliament, but also with the problem of their admission to the elections.
Thus, once again, various essential features of the electoral system, which
would therefore charaeterize the uniform procedure, would depend on
decisions taken at nationar level. This wourd mean maintaining the
preeent provisional mechanism whieh 
- being such - refers the solution
of these key problems to national legislation.
The uniform procedure must actively concern ltself with the problems
of the admissibility or representation of parties, for if matters of such
importance were left to the discretlon of the indLvidual Stateg, there
would be no hope of the procedure being uniform. Eor,rever, the rapport,eur
of the Political Affairs Corunittee recommends the adoption of hybrid
systems, of which there might be many rrariations and from among which the
Illem er States would be free to choose. The systems envisaged range from
proportional systems providing for the election of one quarter of the
lvlembers under the majority system, to majority systems providing for the
election of one quarter of the ltembers under the proportional system.
29. The draft report before the corunittee responsible proposes two
arternative modelsl, ,h" first connected to the Geyerhahn systen adopted
in the FederaL Republic of cermany for the election of the Bundestag, the
seeond to the proportional system: but this eonnection is only apparent.
The first moder (which seems to be preferred by the rapporteur) in
fact contains many key erements of the majority vote system, whereaa, as
we pointed out earlier, the system used for the election of the Bundestag
1-
-See PE 54.569/rev. IV, p. 7.
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is proportional- in every respect, except for the 5% threshold erause.
Then again, the second model is not rea1ly proportional, since a
minimum of three and a maxj.rnum of nine representat,ives would have to be
elected in each of the constituencies into which each Member State would
be divicled (see Article 2 (2) of the draft report).
rt has been estimatedl that in three-seat constituencies (the
minimum considered in the proposar) with five competing parties the
'r9presentation threshold (i.e. the minimum percentaqe of the votes that
a part,v would have to obtain to win the first seat) would be 14.3% and the
exclusion threshold (i.e. the maximum percentaqe of the votes that a partv
a seat where en-seat
constitugltcv (one more than the maximum considered in the proposal under
consideration) the representation threshold would be 7.1% and the exclusion
threshold 9.1%' : in other words, the two-party system is once again proposed.
This was also the objective of those who formulated an identical
proposal 
- subsequently rejected - in the cerman Federal Republic. The
only difference is that in this instance the object,ive was clearly erqplained
by the authors of the proposal.
According to the writer we have just quoted, the criteria envisaged
would conflict with the const.itutional- principles of some tr[ember States
(Belgium, rtary, Luxembourg, the Ne'therrands and the Federar Republic of
Germany).
It seems to be the case that the only obstacle to the introduction
of a uniform electoral procedure ig the desire to enforce the adoption of
selective criteria for the election of the European Parliament which are
influenced by certain trends in European public opinion and would therefore
distort the el-ection results.
However, we may well wonder whether this is the real objective, disguised,
as it were, by the exaggerated importance attached to the need to accommodate
the mechanisms used in one particular Ivlember Stat,ei or whether, on the
contrary, this need is the main preoccupation, since it would allow the
difficult consequences of widespread representation to be avoided.
18. L"nchester: Critical observations on a proposal for
system - Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, Milan
a European electoral
1980, No. 3, p. 960
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The answer is not, however, irnportant, for in either case any possibleproposal muet be brought within the limits of Comnunity l_aw, ag well as
within the linits imposed by most of the Member States.
30- Having thus established that the proportionar system app.ars to bethe most suitable for the direct erection of the European parliament becauseof the guarantee of representativeness it offers the electorate, it is noteasy to serect the formula that would be most in keeping with the aims andthe specific characteristics of the European erection.
Hovrever, this choice is of decisive importance, since the response
of the erectorate and its active participation in the European erections
will depend on the type of mechanism ulti.rnately applied in all the Memberstates' The distrust aroused in the erectorate by a system that arlovredelectoral manoeuvres and manipuration would have damaging consequences forthe process of European integration.
31' The mechanisms used to correct certairl effects of the proportional
system are numerous and are generally appried to systers that combine a
variet'y of different elements- For the erection of the European parliament,
hovrever, these mechanisms should be discouraged, because they could not besatisfactorily applied to the entire territory of the comnunity. we haveonly to cite, in this connection, the method of using the ,remainderg, in asingle centrar constituencY, which allowed the recovery of votes inEufficientto make up the quotient, which the individual lists had to reJ.inquish in thevarious constituencies.
since European parties do noL as yet exist, the ,arious possib!.e
combinations of criteria for distributing votes, which traditionarry favourthe strongest groups, are also to be discouraged.
32- The convention shourd therefore come out in favour of the typical_proportional system based on lists of candidates drawn up in adrrance, i-nother words, the rist system of proportionar representation. Hourever,
assuming that this system was adopted, the method of distributing seatsamong the various list's and the rules governing the choice of candidates tobe incruded on the lists to which seats are arrocated would have to be madeclearer.
A common feature of the 
'arious methods of apprying this system is theneed to calcurate the 'erectoral quotient, (which is obtaired by dividingthe total number of varid votes cast in a given area by the nunber of seats
V"
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allocated to it) and the total number of votes cast for a 1ist (which is the
total number of valid votes obtained by each of the lists of candidates
presented in the constituency). The total number of votes cast for a list
is divided by the electoral quotient to obtain Lhe number of representativeg
on each list that has obtained the quotient. rn other words, the number
of representatives on each list is equal to the number of times the total
number of votes cast for it contains the erectorar quotient.
33. of the various methods of arlocating the 'remainders,, the most
suitable aPPears to be the d'Hondt or 'common divisor, method, under which
the number of representatives allocated to each electoral list is obtained
by dividing the number of votes cast for the list by the electoral divisor.
34. The adoption of the list system of proportional representation raises
the problem of which candidates on each of the lists to which seats have been
allocated shouLd be declared elected. The best known solutions to this
problem consist in the use of the 'brocked or rigid list,, on which the
candidates'names appear in order of preference, so that those at the top
of the list are elected without the eLector being able to influence the
choice, or the 'preference vote'list, which alIows the elector to cast, two
votes, one for the list and the other 
- optionally - for the candidate or
candidates he prefers. In the latter case, the order of candidates on
each list is determined by the total number of preference votes cast for
each of them.
35. The preference may be expressed by the electorate more or l-ess freely,
depending on the system adopted. The system which offers most freedom is
the vote-splitting system, which allovrs the elector to cast his preference
vote, not only for the candidates on the list of his choice, but also for
one or more of the candidates included on different lists. This practice
is alIowed, for exampre, under the rruxembourg erectorar raw.
The vote-splitting system should, however, be rured out because it
seems contradictory to aIlow one vote to be cast for a List comprising
candidatesr of one political group and a second vote to be cast for eandidates
belonging to different political groups.
36- The convention should therefore establish a formula applicable to the
entire community, which might be covered by the following crause:
'The Medbers of the European Parliament shall be elected in accordance
with the list system of proportional representation. The seats Eha1l
be distributed among the lists in accordance with the d'Honclt method.
The elector shalI cast his preferential vote for one or more candidates,
depending on the size of the constituency and the number of candidates
allocated to each Iist,.
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VI. FI'RTHER PROVISIONS IN THE COTIIIE\TIION
37. rn addition to the provisions and principres discussed above, the
new convention should endorse many of the criteria contained in the
earlier convention and taken over by the Council act of 20 Septenber Lg76.
In particular, it should incorporate the substance of Article LO of the
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Hellenic Republic and
the adjustments to the Treatiesl, which alters the composition of the
Assembly by adding 24 Greek Irlembers.
38- The convention should also be brought into tine with the provisions
of the Act of 20 September L976 relating to the duration of the mandate(Article 3), voting (Article 4) ancl the compatibility ancl incompatibility
of the functions of elected Members (Articles 5 ancl 5).
39. Furthermore, it should endorse the substance of Article I of the
Act, which stipulates that 'no one may vote more than once in any election,,
as well as that of Articles 9 and 10, which concern the date of the election,
the rules governing the poll and the constituent meeting of the new
Parliament,.
40- Articles 1I and 12 of the Act of 20 September L976 confer certain
powers on the Member States, pending the entry into force of the uniform
procedure. Naturally, these powers should be revoked, once this resolutory
condition has been met. Except where vacancies arige from the application
of national provisions (insofar as they continue to apply), the convention
should make suitable provision for fi11in9 seats that fall vacant during
the five-year legislative term.
4L. Finally, as regards the final decision in caseg where the election
of candidates to the European Parliament is contested, it should be noted
that in most of the Medber States the responsibility for validating the
election result rests with the national Parliament. The convention should
introduce a similar provision, conferring on the European parLiament the
power to give the definitive ruling in disputes and claims arising from
the European elections. The desirability of sueh a provision is confirmed
by Article 11 of the Act of 20 September Lg76.
10, 
*o. L 2gL of 19. LL.LgTg
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
42. The concept of an 'election by direct universal suffrage in
accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States' calIs for the
introduction, in the Conununity, of an electoral system based on
universally applied principJ-es.
The uniform electoral procedure should therefore be free of
differences that might adversely affect the representati\r€ness of the
European Parlianent.
43. The draft convention which Parliament is drawing up in application
of Artic]-e 21(3) of the ECSC Treatyr.+.rt,icLe L38(3) of the EEC Treaty
and Article 109(3) of the*EAEC Treaty should e:<pressly endorse the general
principles underpinning a uniform eleetoral procedure (the right to vote,
the right to stand for election, compulsory preliminary formalities,
assignment of seats which have become vacant, etc. ). On the other hand,
nationar provisions of an executive nature and those relating to the
definitive or temporary loss of the right to vote and stand for
el-ection following judgements handed down under national criminal 1aw
would remain in force.
44. without prejudice to the observations made in paragraph 42 above,
the Legar Affairs committee accordingly endorses the principres set
out in the draft seittinger report, rev. rv, part A (see pE 64.569/rv,
paragraph 20 ) .
The electoral system for elections to the European parliament
shourd guarantee a distribution of seats which broadly refrects the
percentages of the votes cast for the parties. This wourd enable
Parliament to remain consistent with its established practice of
maximizing its representativeness both in terms of nationaLities
and in terms of political groupings.
45. On the basis of the observations set out above, the Legal
Affairs committee requests the poriticar Affairs committee to take
account of the suggestions made in paragraphs 9 to 15 of this opinion,
either by including appropriate provisions in the draft convention or
by making reference to the Act of 20 September 1976.
- 
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!,IINORITY OPINION
'A minority of Members of the Legal Affairs Committee is of
the opinion that the uniform electorar system shourd be based on
the fullest possible proportionar representation since 9 out of
the 10 l,lember states arready use a proportional system for elections
to the European Parliament.
It therefore believes that the principles set out in
paragraph 20 of the draft SETTL]NGER report rev. rv/A should not
be endorsed. I
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DTRECTOB;AE GENERAL FOR
RESEAREH & D@UIITE\IIATION cDOCU!,IENTATION
THE E=r,EC]TOBAIi LAWS APPLIED FOR THE FrRS1l' E],ECI{ON OF THE EUROPEAN PARLTAMENT
- BY COUNIRY -
ANNEX I
the Chamber
on 14 November 1978,
1. Belqium
(a) 
_r9931_!f:::
Belgium's European elections BiII was ,adofted.by
of Deputies on 3 November L978 and Uji the Senate
it entered into force on 15 November.(b) ltain features of the law
(aa) Seats
11 out of Belgium's
the German-speaking
Candidates must opt
24 seats go to French-speaking regions (including
region) and 13. to the ElemiEh-Epeaking region.
for one of t'these two regions.
(bb) Eletora1 system
- Proportional representation
- 2 electoral corl.eqes (!'reneh./Germal-spea.king regl-onr' Flenish-
-.'..^speaking region)
Seats allocated by the
lnlrabitants of Bruesels
Entitlement to vote:
d'Eondt system in the three constituencies;
vote for a'list 'from one-.of the li,nguistic regions.
- Belgian citizens
- 18 y_ears or 
_orrrE
- also Belgians resident abroad, providedthat theig main place of donicife(r6sidencd principale) is stlll inBelg_i-um. They nay I9t" by_p5gr"y.
- Obligatory vote-
- Eligibility for election: _ 2t years or over
- Belgian nationality
Domiciled in Belgium
- 
Ncminations: r.isEs -o€;EEilrei@+ . proposed either
= \r at lFast 5 geribers of the Belgi_an ,Pa*lambnt belongfag to .on".tioguisti"
corununity, or
- by siglratur.i of at-IeaEt I,OOO regietered
voterg' 1Ir each'of the 5 provincee of theelectoral regl_on chosen.Order of names on lists: Each voter trae"one voEe-*irich he can
give either to a list or to the cand.idate
of his choice on the 1ist (therefore
possibility of changing order of nameE
on lists)
Filling vacant seats; Substitute candidates
Election day: I0 June 1979 (Sunday)
Rules on election cam- No special provisionspaign: for the european elections
Validation of elections: Chanber of Deprtiee
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2. Denmark
(a) LegaI bases
Denmark's electoral law was adopted by the Parliament on 2 Decernlcer
L977 and entered into force on,1 January 197g.
(b) E1!-gse!sr9s_9!-!!s_1es
(aa) Seats
Denmark has 15 of the 16 Danish seats and Greenland one. Itle Faroe
Islands are not taking part in the election.
(bb) EIectoraI system
- 
Proportional representation
- One single national constituency
- Seats allocated by the d,Ilondt system
- Entitlement to vote: 
- Danish citizens
- 18 year" or orr.r *
- also Danish cit,izens resident in other
EEC States
- Eligibility for election: 
- Danish citizens
- 
18 year" o= *ar *
- Nominations: Lists (maximum 20 candidates) proposed
by political parties (or by several
parties jointly). If the party iE not
represented in the Folketing, its list
must be supported by electors numbering
2% of the total votes cast.at last election.
- order of names on lists: Each voter has one vote which he can give
either to the ,I"a or one candidate of
his choice from the list (therefore
possibility of changing order of nameE
on lists)
- FiIIing vacant seats: Next candidate on the 1ist
- Election day: To be decided by the Minister for Ecme
Affairs (Thursday, 7 June)
- Rures on election campaign: The Minister of Justice may issue rrrres to
prevent, disturbances of prrblic order.
- Validation of election: By the Danish parliament
Following the referendum of 20 September 1979
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3. Ihe Federal Republic of Germanv
(a) leg{-Eeees
The German electoral Iaw was adopted on 16 l,larch 1978 by the Bundestag
(Bundesgesetzlclatt I of 2l .fune 1978, p.709). It entered into foreeon 16 June 1978.
(b) !{ain features of the law
(aa) Seats
of the 81 German seats three go to Berrin (west). rhese three seats
to be ecupied by the Lov,rer House (Berlin parliament).
(bb) Electoral system
- 
Proportional representation
- 
Tire electorar area is either the whole of the Feder6r Repubric
(where a party submits a single Federal list) or the
individual Ldnder (wheTe Land lists are submitted).
- 
seats allotted at Federar lever according by the d,Hondt system.
when a party presents lists for the LEnder the total of seats won
by that party are divided according to the d'Hondt proced,ure among
the different regional lists.
- 
Entitlement to vote: 
- German citizens
- 18 years or o\rer
- 
also Germans resident in EEC countries
- 
E-igjlcility for election: 
- cerman citizens
- 18 years or over
-$bmination of candidates: 
- 
political parties and
- 
political asseiations organized on
a membership basis (e.9. trans-
national party federations)
If the party or asseiation is not
already represented l_n the Bund,estag
or Landtag with at Least five seats,
nominations must, in addition, be
supported by 41000 signatures, in the
case of a Federal list, or 21000
signatures in the case of a Land list.
-Order of names on the ILre order in which names appear onlist: the lists is decided by the parties
and determines the order in which
seats are allocated.
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- 
5% clause: Lists which receive felver than 5% of
the votes do not qualify for the
alleation of seats.
- 
Vacant seats: Filled by 'substituteE', who can be
designated at the same time as each
candidate on the list; in the absence
of any substitute, by the next can-
didate on the list.
- Election day: To be decided by the Federal
Government (Srrnday, 10 June)
- 
Rules on election PartieE receive a Eum in proportion
campaign: to their share of the votes from an
election campaign e:<penses fund
totalling approx. 150 mio DI{ (3.50 D!4
per voter).
An agreement between the,trxrtles
iirnlts election campaigir irxpenditure
- Validation of election: Bundestaq. Its decision can be
contested in the Federal Constitutional
Court.
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4. France
(a) L€g1l-81:91
The French electoral law was adopted on 30 June 1977 (Law No.
77-729, Journal officiel of 3 July L977, pp 35-79) . It entered
into force on 7 JulY 1977.(b) !,Iain features of the law
(aa) Seats
France has 81 seats. fhese Members of Parliament also repreaent
France's overseas territories.
(bb) ElectoraL system
- 
Proportional representation
- The whole State forms a single electoral area
- 
Votes are counted and seats allocated for the entire national
territory. Seats are distributed among the individual lists
by the d'Hondt system.
- 
All French citizens aged 18 or over are q!!.1!!91|!9_voE.
French citizens resident abroad can vote at the French
consulates (as in presidential elections) .
- 
To be eliqible for.election candidates must be French citizens
of 23 years or over.
- 
No rules laid down for the nomination of candidates. Nomina-
tions must be subnitted by the candidates at the head of the
list or their representatives. A deposit of IOO,OOO Ff is
required for each list (to be forfeited if fewer than 5% of
the votes are obtained).
- Seats allocated according to the order of names on the list.
voters have a single vote to be given to a Iist. Order of
names on the Lists cannot be changed.
- 
Lists receiving fewer than 5% of the votes cast will not be
allotted any seats.
- 
Vacant seats go to the next candidate on the list.
- 
The law on direct elections contains no special provisions
regarding the election day. In France 1rcIling-day is
traditionally a Sun.dav.
- Rules on the election campaign:
Any French political parties or nominated candidates are
allovred to take part in the election campaign. This wil-l
begin two weeks before election day. During this period
broadcasting time will be made available on radio and
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terevision- Farties winning at least 5% of the votes wilr
have part of ttreir campaign expenseE. refunded.
- 
varidation of election: rltre corrncir of state (not the
constitutionar councir as in the case of national erectione).
.:l-^.L-
a) 
_1.:S:!-il:S:
Tho clccEoral law of Greece was adopted by the parlianenE on
? July I9BI. and ent,ered into'force on 20 JuIy 198I.
s) ii:il-5:1!i:ss-eg-gEg-leg
. 
(aa) Scats
creecc has 24 seaEs
(bb) EleccoraI system
- Proportional representatlon
- 
Ore slngle nsEional constiCuency
- 
Seats allccated by tho d'HondE syst,ero
- 
Entitlcr.rcnt to votos Greck citlzens
- 
20 ycars or over
- 
also Greek citizonE
Ilving abroad, trho EusE
rcturn to Greec€ tO vot,e
- 
Eligibility for electton: 
- Greek ciEizens
- 
26 years or ove!
- 
no residence gualificaEic
. 
i--tlt:l'inrtions: Llsts (maxiraun 24 candi'datr .-..\
proposed by par:ies or
: FoliEical groupings. No
candidate to be enEered on
nore than one list.
,- Ordcr of names on llstsr Farties or political
groupings deterninE tho
order of naoes on Iist.
- Filling vacant oeat€r Next candidata on the list.
- Elcclron day: To be fixed by prosidential
dccrce (Sun3ay, 18 Octobor
r 19SI)
. 
- Rulas on elcctlon campolgn! Canpaign to last 3O days
- 
Vslidatlo.r 
1f 
election: By tho court rcsponsible;
obJections may bo hoard by the
Speclal Supreme Cour!.
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Ireland
(a) legql_Pr:eg
rhe rrish erectorar raw (European Assembly r.r ections Ac'- Lg77)
r.ras adopted by both Houses of parr.iament on g December 1g77 and
entered into force on 9 Decedber Lg?7.(b) YeU_tee!Bl9t_9!-rhe law
i Parliament wil-]. be elected in four
4, 3 and 3 Members,' respectively.
(bb) Electoral system
- Proportional representation
- 4 constituencies
- The traditional single transferable vote system will be used.
candidates will be listed in alphabetical 0rder on the balrotpaper' Each voter can cast his vote for one 
""r,uru"a. and inaddition indicate in order of preference the candidates to
whom his vote should be given if the candidate of his first
choice has already received more than the nunber of votes
necessary for election, or has obtained too few votes and sohas been eliminated -
Entitlement to vote: rrish citizens resident in rreland and
at least L8 years of age; also citizens of cther EEC States
resident in freland.
Candidates must be frish citizens of 2l years or over.
Candidates may nominate themselves, or be nominated by a third party.
For each candidate a deposit of 1,OOO Irish pounds must be paid;this
is refunded if the candidate receives at least one third of the votes
reguired for election.
The alphabetical ord.er in which candidates areballot paper does not affect the order in which
al-located.
Ihere is no 'threshold clauser.
Vacant seats are filled by the Irish parliament. If theformer occupant of the seat belonged to a party, that party
has the right to propose a successor-
(aa) Seats
The 15 lrish Menbers of
constituencies with 5,
listed on the
seats are
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- Polling traditionally takes place on a weekday; the
government has announced its intention of holding the
erection on 7 ilune 1979 (together with locaI electlone).
- No special ru1es on the election campaign.
- Electors or candidates can challenge the election results in
the High Court.
- 
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7. ftalv
(a ) 
_r._egr_r_I3r_s_eir_
The electoral law was adopted by the Senate on
by the Chamber of Deputies on Ig January L979.
force on 24 January 1979(b) Y9r!-!9e!sr9s_eI_!Ig_rgy__(aa) Seats
Italy will have 81 seats.
2 December 1978 and
It entered into
(bb) Electoral system
- Proportional representation
- For direct erections the country is divided into five
constituencies, (North-West, North-East, Centre, South and
- @ at national revet using a system of puretional representation. seats are.alrocit"a iy a regionaldistribution arrangement.
Islands ) .
proPor-
- All rtalian citizens of 1g years or over are eliqibre to vote.
rtalian citizens resident in another EEC country may vote at
the rtarian eonsulates. rtalians from third countries can
vote in their home districts in ltaly.
- candidates must be rtarian citizens of at reast 25 years of age.
- Nominations are submitted by the parties or individuals. rn the
case of individual nominations or nomination by a trErty not
represented in parriament,, the nomination must be endorsed byat least 30,000 electors.
- voters can give their vote to three candidates of their choice
in constituencyl (North-west), two candidates in constituencies
2, 3 and 4 and one candidate in Constituenc,y 5. There is
special provision for preferential votes in areas with
linguistic minorities.
- No provlsion for a rthreshold cla_use..
- 
Vacant seats are filled by the next candidate on the list.
- 
EJ'ection day is traditionally a sunday qrrd Monday-morning. Thedirect elections wiII be held on a Sunday. (10 June)
- Within set limi ts, election camSnign expenses are refunded.
- VaridgtioB of ele_ction: to be conducted in the courts; finalappeal being to the council 0f state and the court of cassation.
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B. Luxembourq
(a) LegaI bases
The Chamber of Deputies adopted the law on 21 February 1979 and
it entered into force on 25 February L979.
(b) Y9i!-Ies!srgs-9!-!hs*l1Y-(aa) Seats
Luxernbourg will have six seats.
(bb) Electoral Bystem
- 
proportional representation
- 
single national constituency
- 
the voteF are co_unted and seats allocated for the whole
country by tJre dtHondt system.
- lgters must be Luxembourg citizens resident in Luxembourg orEi6TEEr country of the Community and aged 18 or over.
Votlng is ggprrlg.;6y
- Candidates must be Luxembourg citizens over 2l-.
- 
The right to submit lists of nominations (max. 12 candidates) is
not confined to parties. Lists must bear the signatures of
100 electors.
- 
Each voter has as many votes as the number of candidates to be
elected. He can distribute theee votes anong the candidates on
one list or vote for individual candidates on another list
('panachager). Or he can sinply vote for a list. In this
way the order of candidates' names in the list nay be changed.
- fhere is no 'threshold clause'
- 
Vacant seats are filled by the next candidate on a list.
- 
In Luxembourg polJ-ing normally takes place on a Sundav.
- 
Election results are validated by the Luxembourg Parliament.
_ 
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Netherlands
9..--.....-.--..'----.----.-:
( a) 
-1,-e-s3-1-!:3-s-1s.
fhe Dutch elec_toral law was adopted by the Second Samber
on 5 Septemben 1.97A. and by ttre First Chamber on 12 Oecenrber Lg7g.
It entered into force on 13 Decedber 197g.
(b) $3I!_E91lgI9s__9!_$9.I_An
(aa) Seats
The Netherlands will have 25 seats.
(bb) Electoral system
- 
proportional representation
- 
a single national constituency
- 
votes are counted and seats allocated by the d'Hondt system
on a naLional basis.
- Dutch citizens who have reached the age of 18 are eliqible
to vote. Dutctr citizens resident in another EEC country may
also vote, either in peraon or by proxy.
In addition citizens from other EEC countries resident in the
Netherland,s also have the right, to vote, provided their homecoutry
has not granted them the right to vote.
- Candidateg must be Dutch citizens of not less than 25 years of
age.
- candidates are nominated by political parties (25 signatures
required). The lists can include up to 40 names. A depoeit
of 18,ooo guilders is reguired when a list is submitted by
parties not represented in the second chamber or the European
Parliament.
- 
Each voter has one vote whictr he can give either to a list or
to one candidate of his choice. rn this way the order of
names on the list can be changed.
- No provision for a tthreshold clauee'.
- vacant seats are firled by the next candidate on the list.
- Ttre erections wilr take place on the rhursdar of the electorar
period.
- 
No special rules on the electoral campaicm.
- Validation of election results b], the Second ChEuiber of parliament.
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1^ United Kinqdom
.LU.
(a) 
_L_"9_tI3j_._",
The European Assedbly Elections Bi:l:l was passed b11 the ll-puse of
Conunons on 16 February 1978 and by-the'House of I,orde on 4 ![ay 1978"
It entered into force on 5 Ivlay L978-
(b) Ivlain features of the.Law
(aa) Seats
Ttre United Kingdom has 81 seats. These are divided among
the different regions as follows:
England z 66 seats
Scotland: I seats
Wales: 4 seats
N. Ireland: 3 seats
(bb) Electoral svstem
Representatives from England, Scotland and Wales are el-ected
according to the traditional majority vote system in individual
constituencies. The three Northern Ireland rePresentatives are
elected by the same system as in Ireland i.e., on a
proportional representation basis in a three-member constituenry.
For the selectbn of candidates, the single transferable vote
system will- be used (cf Ireland)
- 
fhe electoral areas are the different constituencies under
the majority vote system on the one hand and Northern Ireland
with proportional representation on the other.
- 
In those parts of the United Kingdom under the majority vote
system the candidate who wins the highest number of votes is
elected. In Northern freland seats are allocated according
to the Irish systern (qv) .
- 
British and Irish citizens resident in the United Kingdom
aged 18 years or over are @vote. Contrary to the
practice in national elections, I,lernbers of the House of Lords
may vote. British citizens resident outside the country
are not able to vote except in special cases (Government
officials and members of the armed forces).
- 
Candidates must be British citizens of 2L years or over.
Members of the House of Lords and clergymen may also stand
for election.
- 
Candidates need not be nominated by a political party.
Nominations in the constituencies must be endorsed by 30 electors.In addition a deposit of E6O0 must b9 paid which is forfeited ifthe candidate fails to obtain one eighth of the votes cast.
- 
No rthreshold clauses!.
_ 
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Vacant seats are filled by means of by-elections '
Ehe election day i s fixed by the government. (Thursday)
In contrast to national eleetions no striecJ-af iuLes have
been laid down for the European elections, with t-he
exception of a liiritation on cavnpaicn cxpendtture.
There are plans to limit such expenditure in each
constitueney to t5,o@ plus 2 Pence per -registered elector.
Election results can be contested in the Hlgh Court'
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Annex 2
Vote countinq methods
The many vote counting methods used can be divided into two main t1pes, on
which a number of various methods have been based. These are the guota
method ard the larsest averaqe method. The basic difference betrveen these
two methods lies not so mueh in the method of calculation 
- 
both use the
principle of division 
- 
as in the result.
In their commonest forms quota methods do not usually result in the
allocation of all the seats. A number of seats are left over, which then
have to be alloeated by means of another method of ealculation. Divisor
methods, on the other hand, invariably permit the allocation of all seats.
The quota method
This ne thod is based on the principle that a seat should be allocated for
a given number of votes. The quota is a quotient: the dividend is as a
rule the number of valid votes cast in the constituency, while the divisor
can vary. It is either equivalent to the number of seats to be allocated
in the constituency or this number plus one, two, three, etc. An increase
in the divisor produces smaller quotas. Consequently, the larger the
divisor, the rarger the number of seats which can be alrocated by the
quota method.
The commonest type of quota method is the Haqenbach-Bischoff
quota being obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by
seats to be allocated in the constituency plus one.
Examples:
In a particular constituency ten seats are to be allocated;
valid votes have been cast for five parties as follows:
method, the
the number of
Party A
Party B
Party C
Party D
Party E
330, 000
98,000 votes
65,000 votes
90,000 votes
50,000 votes
27,OOO votes
32,000 32,000 24,OOO 17,OOO 27,OOO
Annex (Vote counting rnethods I)
Applying the simple quota method the quota would be
330,000 = 33,000
IO
PartiesABCDE
Votes 98,000 65,000 9O,OOO 5O,OOO 27,OOOdivided. bvcflrota 9iv€s 2 seats I seat 2 seat. I 
""ag 0 seats
Remainder
- 
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Vote countinq methods (cont. )
Only six of the ten seats can be allocated by this method; the remaining
four seats must be distributed by a second nethod.
If the Haqenbach-Bischoff method is used, the quota is:
330,000 
= 30,00010+1
Parties ABCDE
votes 99,000 55,000 g0,ooo 50,000 27,ooodivided by
quota gives 3 seats 2 seats 3 seats 1 seat 0 seats
Remainder 8,000 5,000 , Q 20,000 27,OOO
Only nine of the ten seats can be allocated by this method; the
remaining seat, must be allocated by a second method.
Larqest averaqe methods (also known as divisor methods)
Here the number of votes obtained by the parties in the constituency or
electoral district is divided by a series of numbers (divisors). The seats
are allocated according to the size of the resulting quotients.
The various methods use different series of divisors as follows:
d'Hondt method
Imperialj- method
Sainte-taguE method
Adjustment method or
madified Sainte-LaguE method I.4 - 3 - 5 - 7 -
Danish method I 
- 
4 
- 7 -10 -
Examples:
Ten members are to be elected in a given constituency; 330,000 valid
votes have been cast for five parties as follows:
t-2-3-4-
2-3-4-5-
1-3-5-7-
Party A
Party B
Party C
Party D
Party E
98,000 votes
65,000 votes
90,000 votes
50,000 votes
27,OOO votes
Annex (vote counting methods If)
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Vote countinq methods (Cont. )
The d'Hondt method produces the following results:
Divisor Party A Party B Party C
I 98, OO0 (1) 65,000 (3) 90,000 (2',)
2 49,000 (5) 32,5OO (8) 45,000 (6)
3 32,656 (71 2L,656 30,000
4 24, 500 13,000 22,5OO
The Imperiali- method produces the following results:
Divisor Party A Party B Party C
2 49, 000 ( 1) 32 , 000 (4) 4s, 000 l2')
3 32,656 (3) 2L,666 (9) 30,000 (5)
4 24,5OO (71 t6,25O 22,5OO (8)
5 19,600 (10) 13,000 18,000
The Sainte-LaquE method:
Party D
50,000 (4)
25,OOO (10)
L6,666
12, 500
Party E
27,OOO (9)
13, 500
9, 000
7,25O
Party D
25,000 (5)
L6,666
L2,5OO
I0, 000
Party E
13, 500
9, 000
7,250
5,4OO
The adiustment method:
Divisor
I
3
5
Divisor
1.4
3
5
Party A
98,000 (1)
32,656 (5)
19, 600 (8 )
Party A
70,000 (1)
32,656 (5)
19,600 (8)
Party A
98,000 (r)
24,5OO (6)
14,000 (8)
Party B
65,000 (3)
2L,666 (7)
l_3,000
Party B
46,428 (3)
2t,666 (7)
13,000
Party B
65,000 (3)
13,000 (9)
9,295
Party C
90,000 (2)
30,000 (6)
18,000
Party C
64,285 (2)
30,000 (6)
18, o0o (10)
Party D
50,000
L6,666
r0, 000
Party E
(4',) 27,OOO
(10) 9, ooo
5,400
Party D
35,7L4 (4)
L6,666
10, 000
Party E
L9,285 (9)
9, 000
5,400
The Danish method:
Divisor
I
4
7
Party C
90,000 (21
22 ,5OO (71
L2,857 (10)
Party D
50,000 (4)
L2,5OO
7,L42
Party E
27,OOO (5)
7,25O
3,857
Annex (vote counting methods rrr)
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